Tipping the Scales

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Tue, 01 Oct 2013 - 12:05 GMT

BY

Tue, 01 Oct 2013 - 12:05 GMT

Despite years of attempts to silence them, the Muslim Brotherhood wield enough influence to be feared. Here’s why.
By Hana Zuhair
Egypt’s largest religious political group has been at the fore of events since the 2011 Revolution and their subsequent win of the majority of seats in the nation’s first elected parliament post-Mubarak. Feared, loathed and much-maligned, the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) in Egypt has been challenged on every front ­— most recently by a court ruling dissolving the Parliament of which they were a majority as well as a separate court case calling for the disbanding of the religion-based group. Yet today, the once-outlawed and vilified Muslim Brotherhood stands on the steps of the Presidential Palace, with Mohamed Morsy, fielded by the MB’s Freedom and Justice Party, elected Egypt’s first post-revolution president. The influence of the Muslim Brotherhood promises to continue unshaken. How did the Brotherhood manage for decades, three of them under Mubarak’s iron fist, to persevere? More pointedly, how were they able to garner all this support, particularly at a time where many were calling for a civilian rather than religious state? Egypt Today follows the rise of the Brotherhood. Early History 1928: Imam and schoolteacher Sheikh Hassan El Banna, along with six Suez Canal company workers, founded the group in the Ismailiya in an attempt to revive the early teachings of Islam. Little did they know that the group would become one of the strongest and largest Islamic and political forces in the region. 1928-1938: Al-Banna supported the implementation of Shariah (Islamic Jurisprudence) and enhancing a social revivalist movement based on religion against British Imperial rule, and social and political injustice. The organization was initially more concerned with charitable and educational work, but its advocacy for disenfranchised economic classes, by being a key player in Egypt’s nationalist movement, turned it into a substantial political force. 1940: Within a decade, the Brotherhood had garnered a wide following and managed to sign on 500,000 active members in Egypt alone. Al-Banna succeeded in recruiting people from the nation’s different strata with his call for change coming from the bottom up rather than via a coup. As such, educated employees, civil servants and professionals dominated the Brotherhood’s highest ranks. 1948-1949: As the MB sent volunteers to fight in the 1948 Arab-Israeli war in Palestine, Egyptians’ increasing dissatisfaction with the monarchy was reaching its peak. Prime Minister Mahmoud al-Nukrashi Pasha, fearing the group’s growing influence, disbanded it in December 1948 after police seized documents containing names and plans of a secret militia involved in bombings and assassination attempts; 32 members from the movement’s highest ranks were imprisoned. The Brotherhood, in retaliation, murdered judge Ahmed Khazendar, who had ordered the imprisonment of MB members on charges of attacking British soldiers. The group also assassinated al-Nukrashi and attempted to bomb the Court of Cassation to get rid of incriminating evidence. El-Banna promptly condemned the killing of al-Nukrashi, calling it against basic Islamic principles. On February 12, 1949, Al-Banna and his brother-in-law were shot while waiting for a taxi, after Minister Zaki Ali Pasha, with whom they were supposed to meet, stood them up. Al-Banna died of his wounds and was succeeded by Judge Hassan El-Houdeiby. Under Nasser 1954-1970: After an assassination attempt on his life, then-President Gamal Abdel Nasser outlawed the group, and scores of MB members were thrown in detention camps where many reportedly died after severe torture. In 1957, 21 members were allegedly killed in their cells. One of the most prominent MB figures tortured in prison was Sayyid Qutb, best known for his book Social Justice and one of the group’s most influential thinkers. 1965: The government ordered another huge crackdown on the Brotherhood, claiming it was preparing a revolutionary plot against the regime. Some 18,000 were arrested, 100 to 200 were imprisoned including 38 who were killed during investigations. Police raids against the group spread throughout the country, and the government launched an intense smear campaign against the MB. 1966: Qutb and two other Brotherhood members were hanged after confessions reportedly obtained under severe torture. Years later unconfirmed reports abounded that plots were allegedly fabricated by the regime in an attempt to get rid of the Brotherhood. Under Sadat 1970-1981: Aiming to introduce political and economic liberalization, Sadat shut down the detention camps in 1971, released most of the imprisoned Brotherhood members, and allowed the exiles to return. The MB remained illegal, however, and leftists criticized the MB’s undefined stance against Sadat’s regime when it came to economic inequality. Many of its members profited under Sadat’s free-market policies — viewed by leftists as hypocritical since the group’s original principles championed Islamic socialism. 1973: El-Houdeiby, the group’s second Supreme Guide, passed away. He was the author of Preachers, Not Judges, an indirect refutation of Qutb’s book Milestones that called for the importance of Jihad, and which inspired the formation of radical groups. No leader was named officially but Umar Talmasani became the most renowned spokesperson of the group at the time. 1975: Brotherhood members still in jail were freed in the general amnesty. Sadat’s move to rehabilitate the group was seen as an attempt to counter the socialist movement. 1976: The Brotherhood were granted further freedoms when the regime allowed them to establish their own monthly newspaper Al Da’wah (calling for Islam). 1977: Sadat’s government passed the Political Parties Law, which prohibited the formation of religion-based parties. This was a blow to the Muslim Brotherhood, which by this time had the objective of gaining legal and political recognition. 1980: Sadat’s government amended the Constitution to state that Islamic jurisprudence “is the main source of legislation” in the country, after the MB’s persistent demand for the complete implementation of Shariah. 1981: Al Da’wah newspaper, with a circulation of 100,000 copies, was shut down after voicing its opposition to the Camp David Accords and the 1979 Egypt-Israel peace treaty. That October, Sadat was assassinated by the militant Al Jihad group. Prior to his assassination, Sadat’s popularity had plunged significantly, reportedly the reason why he ordered a crackdown on opposition groups. Many were arrested, including Brotherhood members. Under Mubarak 1981-2011: The MB maintained the same relationship with Mubarak as they did with Sadat. Despite periodical arrests they were able to keep their offices, and their top thinkers published books that were available nationwide. 1992: The government started taking more repressive measures against the group, fearing the Brotherhood’s increasing influence in charity and mosques. 1995-1996: Around 1,000 Brotherhood members were arrested. Some were tried in military courts and imprisoned on the charges of plotting to overthrow the government. Meanwhile, the government launched a campaign to discredit the MB. Also in 1996, Hamid Abu Al Nasr, the Supreme Guide of the group at the time, died. Mustapha Mashhur, the MB’s first Deputy, became his successor. A hardliner, Mashhur was a member of the underground secret apparatus and had spent a total of 16 years in prison. In response, then-Interior Minister Hassan El-Alfi ordered the arrest of 46 MB members. 1998: Internal rifts began to appear in MB ranks between the ‘old guard’ dominating the Guidance Bureau and younger generation leaders over cooperating with different political forces. 2000: MB made moderate political gains, with 76 members running for Parliament as independents. One MB female, Gihan Al-Halafawi, actually won in her district but elections are cancelled there. A total of 17 members won seats, despite smear campaigns and arrests right before people went to the polls. 2005: Some 700 members were arrested for participating in protests for reforms with other movements such as Kifaya. That year, MB members won 88 parliamentary seats by running as independents, forming the largest opposition block in government. 2011-2012: Many of the Brotherhood youth informally joined protestors in Tahrir demanding Mubarak step down, and the group officially started protesting by January 28. In March, the MB pushed for the constitutional amendments referendum, which the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) supported as well. Egypt’s left, liberals and revolutionary forces opposed it, calling for an entirely new Constitution instead. After Mubarak’s ouster, the Brotherhood was granted legal status and allowed to form the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP), the political arm of the Brotherhood. Despite initially promising it wouldn’t be running for more than 30% of Parliament’s seats, the FJP contested more than half the seats. In September’s parliamentary elections, which saw a 60% voter turnout, the Brotherhood won 127 seats via party list and 108 seats as independent candidates, giving them a total of 235 out of 508 seats — the largest bloc in the first Parliament post revolution. Unsubstantiated rumors circulated that MB leadership had struck a deal with the SCAF to support the elections schedule despite protests calling for their delay. As the vote went ahead as planned, the Brotherhood won nearly half the seats, while allowing the SCAF to retain ultimate power — a situation that served the short-term interests of both sides. Shortly after the revolution and again after their parliamentary success, the Brotherhood assured the people, who feared their dominance, that they weren’t interested in reaching Egypt’s highest office. The group went so far as to expel longtime leading member Abdel Moneim Abolfotoh after he announced after the revolution that he would run for president as an independent; it also expelled other members who supported his campaign. Right before the nomination period, however, the Brotherhood once again reneged on its promise, announcing that the FJP was nominating Deputy Supreme Guide Khairat El-Shater for presidency. Right before the nominations closed, the FJP also nominated its chairman Mohamed Morsy as a backup candidate. Critics called the move hypocritical and said it proved the MB was out to dominate the legislative and executive arms of government. The Supreme Presidential Elections Commission (SPEC) disqualified El-Shater among nine other hopefuls in April, for his prison conviction under Mubarak’s regime, but left Morsy in the race. Morsy garnered the highest number of votes in the first round, reaching the presidential runoff with Ahmed Shafik, Mubarak’s Civil Aviation Minister and last Prime Minister. The MB declared it a victory not for their organization but for the revolution against the old regime. Two days before the runoff, Egypt’s Supreme Court ruled the current People’s Assembly unconstitutional and the lower house was dissolved. Many viewed this as a tactic by SCAF to muffle the Brotherhood ahead of the elections and force Shafik into office. Others saw it as a ploy to garner sympathy for the Brotherhood in their bid for presidential office. Hours after polls closed on June 17, Morsy declared he had won the elections based on preliminary reports from 97% of the poll stations. But many criticized the decision to announce a premature victory, accusing the Brotherhood of forcing public support, particularly after reports emerged of flagrant vote rigging by the MB. The official results backed the claim however: On June 24, the SPEC confirmed that Morsy won 51.73% of the vote, becoming Egypt’s first democratically elected president.

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