IN 2003, US PRESIDENT George W. Bush disclosed a three-stage blueprint for peace he dubbed the Road Map, an outline for how to end violence in the Middle East and establish a Palestinian state by the year 2005.

Bush revised that deadline last month to 2009, the end of his second term in office, prompting speculation about whether or not Israel will go forward with its planned unilateral withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and parts of the West Bank.

In Israel, analysts also wonder what the withdrawal will mean for the Road Map.

Early this year, Bush expressed his support for Israel’s views on core issues in the final status negotiations: He recognized Israel’s settlements in the West Bank and denied Palestinian refugees the right of return, saying they must settle in a Palestinian state, not Israel.

For Asa’d Ghanem, a Palestinian-Israeli professor of political science at Haifa University, the revised timeline for the establishment of a Palestinian state underscores the influence Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon manages to exert in Washington.

“Bush should have said that the Palestinian State would be established in 2007 instead of 2009 so we can take his commitment seriously. I think there is no hope to have the US put pressure on Israel [to move ahead with the peace process],” Ghanem says, pointing to pro-Israel appointees in the second Bush White House.

In that context, Ghanem expects the US will continue to back Sharon’s disengagement as consistent with the Road Map.

Sharon disclosed the plan in late 2003, outlining a unilateral Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip by the year 2005 and the consolidation of settlements built in the West Bank after 1967 War as parts of the State of Israel. He claimed then that plan was motivated by the absence of a Palestinian partner for peace.

But while Sharon and Bush claim the withdrawal is not an abandonment of the Road Map, Dov Weinglass, a senior advisor to the Israeli prime minister, dropped a political bombshell in October when he explained that the real objective of the plan was to allow Israel “to park conveniently in an interim situation that distances us as far as possible from political pressure.

“The disengagement plan is actually formaldehyde,” he said in an exclusive interview with the respected Israeli daily Haaretz. “It supplies the amount of formaldehyde that is necessary so that there will not be a political process with the Palestinians.”

The disengagement plan has met strong opposition from Sharon’s Likud party and the religious right. Seizing the disappearance of Arafat as a ‘new political opportunity,’ foes of the plan called on Sharon to delay the withdrawal until a new Palestinian leadership is formed. The Israeli PM quickly dashed their hopes when he announced his determination to move ahead.

Sharon declared that the pullout could be coordinated with the PA on the condition that it crack down on ‘terror’ groups and was quoted in the Israeli press as saying, “If as time passes, we notice that the new Palestinian leadership is willing to clamp down on terrorist organizations, we could coordinate and reach agreements regarding the area slated for evacuation.”

The Palestinian Authority has always rejected the plan as “a violation of the Road Map.” The late Arafat reiterated that the pullout from Gaza must be accompanied by a similar withdrawal from the West Bank and Jerusalem.

If Arab and Palestinian analysts are guarded about how the disengagement might affect restarting the peace process (see main story), many Israeli analysts are decidedly more optimistic.

“There is a better chance than before, given Bush’s renewed commitment and the pressure from his EU allies, who put the Israeli-Palestinian issue as their price for mending transatlantic relations,” says Aluf Benn, a journalist with Haaretz.

Benn believes Arafat’s prospective successors can boost the peace process, but he does not expect a permanent settlement.

“I think that Arafat’s death has taken away Israel’s claim to have ‘no partner’ on the Palestinian side and, therefore, a major obstacle to negotiations,” he says. “I doubt, however, that it can lead to a permanent settlement, given the strong objection on both sides to any compromise on ‘core’ issues like refugees and Jerusalem. There is a better chance, however, to stop the fighting and move toward an interim settlement, which may include a Palestinian state.”

Benn expects Palestinian-Israeli coordination on the Gaza pullout, but doubts it will lead to post-disengagement negotiations on the situation in the West Bank.

Nigel Parsons, a specialist in Palestinian politics at Massey University in New Zealand, agrees that both parties are likely to coordinate their efforts to maintain security in the Strip after the Israeli withdrawal.

“Israel could revive the Oslo arrangements for coordination and cooperation between the two sides, including the [Israeli Defence Forces-PA] joint offices for policing and civil matters, the District Coordination Offices, and District Civil Liaison Offices. This type of arrangement could be used to allow the PA to take over the settlements in Gaza in an orderly fashion, if they are evacuated,” Parsons concludes.  et