OPINION: 'Foreign Affairs' and the fallacies about Egypt's foreign policy

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Sun, 11 Feb 2018 - 09:10 GMT

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Sun, 11 Feb 2018 - 09:10 GMT

President Abdel Fatah al-Sisi chairs the meeting of the AU Peace and Security Council in Addis Ababa on January 28, 2018- press photo

President Abdel Fatah al-Sisi chairs the meeting of the AU Peace and Security Council in Addis Ababa on January 28, 2018- press photo

CAIRO - 11 February 2018: On first read Michael Wahid Hanna and Daniel Benaim’s recent piece for Foreign Affairs gives a positive impression of Egyptian policy and its move toward independence. But “Egypt First: In the Era of Sisi, Egypt Is Going Its Own Way" is, on closer inspection, full of exaggerations and presents examples out of context in a way that paints a foreign policy whose principles contradict actions on the ground.

Though the writers tried to highlight the independence of Egyptian politics since 2013—pointing outits difference from its traditional regional and international partners, that it is characterized by three main features: anti-political Islam; adherence to the sovereignty of states; and non-interference in internal affairs—and attempt to rallynational feelings and raise the importance of the inevitability of the leading role of Egypt in the region, the article is full of fallacies.

The first of these fallacies is that Egypt’s adoption of an independent policy and diversification of relations came following the fall of former President Mubarak, offering as an example the visit of Muslim Brotherhood President Mohamed Morsi to China and Russia. Contrary to what happened at the time, the Brotherhood's gestures showed keenness to continue Egypt's traditional relations. They made sure to visit the United States to obtain US support for the elections and stressed that the peace agreement with Israel would not be compromised.

The second major fallacy is the attempt by the authors to show the contradiction between Egypt's principle of supporting the sovereignty of states and its behavior by supporting Saudi Arabia against Qatar. Here they forget that cutting off diplomatic relations with any country is not interference in its sovereignty. Rather, it is a protest against harming the interests of the boycotting countries and has nothing do with interfering in Qatar’s internal policies.

The authors also argue that the fight against political Islam is Egypt’s motive to combat all forms of its affiliated organizations in Libya and Syria, and the reason behind its opposition to the use of jihadist groups as agents in the conflicts. The opposition explains Egypt’s alignment with Russia, support for Bashar al-Assad, and the pressure it has put pressure on Hamas. This is an attempt by the authors to stress that the motive for any Egyptian move stems merely from its hostility to political Islam groups.

Yet Egypt's foreign policy strategy toward conflict issues in Syria, Libya and Iraq clearly confirms that this policy has since 2013 been based first and foremost on the unity of the national state, the support of official state institutions and the rejection of any role played by armed or unregulated groups or militias in dissolving states on the basis of ethnic, sectarian, ethnic or regional divisions. The second pillar is non-interference in the internal affairs of States. The third pillar is the peaceful settlement of conflicts and the rejection of any military intervention, especially that the issues of the region are resolved away from the self-will of the involved parties.

What the writers have ignored is the fact that those fighting in Libya and Syria are a group of jihadist factions, some of whom have links to al Qaeda and Daesh. In both conflicts, Egypt has proceeded in line with the founding principles of of its foreign policy, with the support of its national institutions such as the army to establish stability. It has played the role of mediator and created rounds of dialogue between opposing factions to support political and security tracks in parallel. As for the argument that Egypt put pressure on Hamas for its association with the Muslim Brotherhood, the authors have neglected the fact that the success of Egypt's reconciliation efforts is based in part on the reconciliation document signed by Hamas in May 2011—before the advent of the Brotherhood and their enforced rule. Moreover, the Hamas move came in response to internal and regional circumstances that encouraged Cairo to invite the parties to reconcile.

Finally, what the authors have presented as contradictory in Egypt's external strategy may in future put it in a difficult situation with its traditional partners. It is a conclusion that does not indicate the authors' knowledge of the dynamics of recent interactions in the region, especially that current hot-button conflict issues have revealed the absence of any rules or regulations governing the region. The conflicts in Syria, Libya, Yemen, Iran, Lebanon, Iraq, Turkey and Qatar have proven the absence of the concept of regional security and indicated a lack of awareness among involved parties sharing common interests that even in the presence of challenges, of differences and threats must be collectively overcome. In the context of this regional environment, which is characterized by temporary and often shiftingalliances based on sectarian, ethnic and ideological foundations, Egypt's foreign policy is defined by diversification of choices, due to its own internal challenges such as development.

The writer is a political analyst at the International Relations Department, Cairo University.

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